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Introduction
This study examines inter-ethnic social tolerance in the Turkish context, between the 
dominant ethnic group, Turks, and the largest ethnic minority, Kurds. We believe that the 
Turkish case provides a quite timely context within which to investigate inter-ethnic relations. 
In the Turkish setting, Kurds constitute the second-largest ethnic group after Turks, making 
up 15–17 per cent of the total Turkish population.1 Turkey’s Kurds, who are not officially 
recognised as a minority group, have been demanding certain cultural rights (e.g. speaking, 
publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish, public education in Kurdish, official status for the 
Kurdish language) and political rights (e.g. constitutional recognition of Kurdish ethnic 
identity and power-sharing arrangements such as decentralisation, regional autonomy or 
self-rule, translated as özerklik or öz yönetim) for decades. However, until the early 2000s, the 
Turkish state responded to these demands mostly with a policy of denial, suppression and 
assimilation (Yegen 2004, 2009). Not surprisingly, such state attitudes and policies triggered 
the rise of a Kurdish ethnonationalist movement. As widely analysed, the Kurdish 
ethnopolitical movement in both peaceful and violent forms has posed a major challenge 
to the Turkish state since the mid-1980s (e.g. see Bruinessen 2000; Gunter 2004; Yegen 2004, 
2009; Marcus 2007; Watts 2010; Gunes 2012; Romano & Gurses 2014; Aydin & Emrence 2015). 
The Turkish state has been fighting against the Kurdish insurgent group, the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan – PKK) for the last three decades and the conflict 
has claimed around 40,000 lives (see Watts 2010, p. 22; Aydin & Emrence 2015, p. 2).
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In the early 2000s, the Turkish state softened its attitude on the Kurdish issue. Finally 
recognising the ethnopolitical aspect of the problem, Turkish governments have initiated 
democratisation efforts in addition to socioeconomic and security measures. For instance, 
governments have granted some basic cultural rights to Kurds, such as introducing elective 
Kurdish courses, legalising sermons, publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish as well as the 
opportunity to learn the Kurdish language and allowing parents to give their children Kurdish 
names. In addition, Kurdish political parties are now allowed to conduct party campaigns 
in Kurdish. The European Union (EU) accession process played a key role in moderating the 
Turkish state’s attitude towards the Kurdish issue (see also Özdemir & Sarigil 2015).
In addition to accommodating some Kurdish demands as a result of EU pressure, 
governments have taken some steps towards peacefully resolving the three decades of 
armed conflict between the security forces and the PKK. The conservative Justice and 
development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) and Kurdish groups (i.e. pro-Kurdish 
political parties in parliament and the PKK leadership) have been negotiating for a final 
peaceful settlement of the Kurdish conflict since 2009. Following the failure of the initial 
attempts (i.e. the 2009 Kurdish Initiative and the 2009–11 Oslo Talks), the government 
launched direct talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in late 2012, an initiative 
called the Peace Process (Çözüm Süreci). In March 2013, Öcalan sent a letter from prison on 
Imrali Island (in the Sea of Marmara) and declared a ceasefire. However, the ceasefire and 
the Peace Process collapsed after the June 2015 general election and ferocious armed conflict 
between security forces and the PKK resumed.
despite the fact that the Kurdish conflict has already resulted in massive human, social 
and economic costs to both sides, we have not seen mass-scale communal violence between 
the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority. Nevertheless, increasing anti-Kurdish attitudes 
and discourses in society (e.g. see Bora 2003; Saracoglu 2009; Yegen 2009) and the growing 
number of incidents of sporadic violence in urban settings (e.g. physical attacks against 
Kurdish seasonal workers and buildings belonging to pro-Kurdish parties and Kurdish 
businesses in Turkey’s western and central Anatolian provinces) further encouraged us to 
scrutinise the level and determinants of social tolerance between Turks and Kurds.
Given the bloody, prolonged and intractable ethnopolitical conflict in the Turkish setting, 
it is quite puzzling that the existing literature offers us limited empirical knowledge of the 
inter-ethnic (in)tolerance between Turks and Kurds.2 With such a major limitation in the 
extant literature, we raise the following questions in this study: How do Kurds and Turks 
differ in terms of their social tolerance towards out-groups? What factors account for the 
variance in ethnic (in)tolerance between Turks and Kurds? Are religious individuals more 
tolerant? does a cross-cutting sectarian division (i.e. Alevi vs. Sunni) boost inter-ethnic 
tolerance? How and to what extent do (ethno)nationalist orientations and intergroup contact 
in the private and public spheres affect ethnic tolerance?
The rest of the article is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the nexus 
between tolerance and democratisation in general. The article then provides a discussion 
of the existing research on the possible impact of religion (i.e. religiosity and cross-cutting 
religious sectarian differences), (ethno)nationalism and intergroup social contact on inter-
ethnic tolerance and draws some testable hypotheses. The empirical section first presents 
the variables, measurement and data and then provides statistical results (descriptive and 
multi-variate analyses). The final section summarises the results of the empirical analyses 
and discusses the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
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Tolerance and democracy
The nexus between political culture and democratic consolidation has been widely discussed 
in the existing literature. It is argued that institutions (e.g. a liberal constitution, free and 
competitive elections and political parties) are necessary but not sufficient to make 
democracy work (Gibson 1998). democracy also requires a supportive culture, in which 
ethnic, religious and ideological differences and other salient identities can peacefully 
coexist. Scholars such as Putnam (1993) note that civic culture is the primary factor that, in 
his study, generates better democracy and higher economic development in northern Italy. 
Other scholars also share the argument that consolidating democracy requires not only 
democratic institutions and procedures but also an appropriate political culture (i.e. 
democratic values, beliefs and attitudes among the masses) (Almond & Verba 1989; diamond 
1994a, 1999; linz & Stepan 1996; Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer 1998; Inglehart 2000; Tessler & 
Altinoglu 2004).
Values and norms such as tolerance, moderation, civility, respect for opposing viewpoints 
and willingness to compromise constitute a democratic political culture (e.g. see diamond 
1994a, 1994b; Inglehart 2000). Similarly, Gibson (2006, p. 21), who defines tolerance as 
‘putting up with that with which one disagrees’, suggests that it is ‘one of the few viable 
solutions to the tensions and conflict brought about by multiculturalism and political 
heterogeneity’. Gibson (2006, p. 29) treats tolerance as an ‘essential endorphin of a democratic 
body politic’, stating that ‘[i]ntolerance not only threatens established democratic systems, 
but it also makes democratic transitions arduous by undermining the consolidation of 
democracy (as in so-called illiberal democracies), especially in multicultural polities’.
If tolerance is regarded as one of the cultural requisites of a strong and vibrant democracy, 
then it is worthwhile to investigate the causal factors and dynamics behind the level of (in)
tolerance among ethnic groups, particularly in multi-ethnic societies challenged by severe, 
prolonged ethno-political conflicts such as Turkey. Investigating ethnic tolerance in such 
countries is essential because the lack of tolerance, in particular intolerance towards politically 
salient ethnic groups, can deepen social divisions to the extent that it increases distrust 
among ethnic groups, which, in return, makes it difficult to overcome major local and national 
challenges. For example, intolerance poses a major task especially regarding solving ethnic 
conflict in a country where thousands of people have been killed because of it and billions 
of dollars spent on security apparatus to combat it. Intolerance begets intolerance, resulting 
in an unconsolidated democracy and even a reversion to authoritarian regimes if the elites 
are adept at manipulating historical episodes, prejudices and economic problems for the 
sake of power (Snyder 2000; Hutchison 2014). A functioning democracy requires the different 
ideological or ethnic groups to have a substantial level of tolerance towards each other’s 
social, political and economic demands; therefore intolerance has grave social and political 
ramifications that can lead to devastating outcomes such as ethnic cleansing or separatism 
(Sekulić, Massey & Hodson 2006).
Hypotheses
In this study, we are particularly interested in the three major factors that influence inter-
ethnic tolerance: religious identification, (ethno)nationalism and intergroup contact. In this 
200  Z. SARIGIl ANd E. KARAKOc
section, building upon the existing literature, we offer four testable hypotheses on the impact 
of these factors on inter-ethnic social tolerance.
Religious identification
According to studies on the role of shared identity in inter-ethnic relations, one argument, 
also known as the ‘the common in-group identity model’, asserts that in-group bias can be 
reduced when members of different groups perceive themselves as part of a shared, inclusive, 
overarching category (e.g. a shared religion) (e.g. see Gaertner & dovidio 2000). It is expected 
that a shared, superordinate identity will suppress negative feelings towards out-group 
members and so foster intergroup harmony. In contrast, in countries where people adhere 
to different religions, they may be mobilised along religious lines, which stimulates 
intolerance towards out-group members (Stouffer 1955; Hodson, Sekulic & Massey 1994). 
However, this linkage may operate indirectly, for example, through a complex process of 
group differentiation, as Kunovich and Hodson (1999) find in croatia, where religion is likely 
to be a boundary marker as a result of historical factors such as the policies of the former 
Yugoslavia and the civil war that followed the fall of that regime.
In the Turkish case, Islam cannot be a strong boundary marker because the vast majority 
of Turks and Kurds self-identify as Muslim. Thus, being Muslim is a religious superordinate 
identity. One might expect that a strong attachment to a shared, overarching Muslim identity 
might promote tolerance between ethnic in-group and out-group members. For instance, 
Hindriks, Verkuyten and coenders (2014, p. 56) expect that ‘when individuals identify more 
strongly with their religious group, they can be expected to regard those who have the same 
faith more strongly as in-group members’. Therefore, one can expect that members of ethnic 
groups with high religiosity are more likely to evaluate one another positively than those 
with lower religiosity. In their analysis of inter-ethnic minority relations among immigrant 
groups in the Netherlands, the authors found some empirical support for their expectation: 
more-religious Muslim respondents were more positive towards the Muslim out-group (i.e. 
Turkish and Moroccan immigrants).
Such an expectation is also widely shared among conservative circles in Turkey, including 
AKP officials. Rather than to nationality or ethnicity, these circles attribute greater value and 
significance to overarching identities such as the ‘Islamic brotherhood’ or ‘ummah’ (the 
worldwide community of Muslim believers) (see also Sakallioglu 1998; Ataman 2003; Akturk 
2011; Gurses 2015). Treating Islam as a cement between Turks and Kurds, these circles expect 
that promoting a shared Muslim identity will weaken the role of ethnicity in self-identification 
and improve inter-ethnic relations between the two groups. For instance, Yavuz (1998, 
p. 12) claims that ‘the Islamic layer of identity could be useful in terms of containing ethnic 
tensions and finding a peaceful solution’. Therefore, it is expected that promoting Islam and 
Islamic values in society will enhance inter-ethnic tolerance. Some empirical works, however, 
provide contrary evidence; that is, they find a negative association between religiosity and 
tolerance (e.g. see carkoglu & Toprak 2007, p. 53; Yesilada & Noordijk 2010). Given all these 
factors, we expect:
H1: Religious Turks and Kurds in Turkey are more likely to show tolerance towards ethnic out-
group members.
In addition to the degree of religiosity, we investigate the possible impact of sectarian 
differences on inter-ethnic social tolerance. We are particularly interested in the possible 
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effect of cross-cutting sectarian cleavages. Regarding cross-cutting versus overlapping 
cleavages, a classic work asserts that reinforcing or overlapping cleavages are relatively more 
likely to lead to conflict and contentious politics (see Truman 1951). Another classic work, 
however, shows that despite a highly segmented society with overlapping cleavages, a stable 
and effective democracy was achieved in the Netherlands (lijphart 1968).
In the Turkish context, although the vast majority of Turks and Kurds are Muslim, there 
are major sectarian divisions within the religion. Most people subscribe to the Sunni Islamic 
jurisprudence (around 90 per cent of respondents identify themselves as Sunni Muslim). 
Alevis, known as a heterodox, syncretistic Muslim community, constitute the second-largest 
religious sect.3 The Alevi–Sunni sectarian division cross-cuts the ethnic division (Turks vs. 
Kurds). For instance, Turkish Alevis share similar norms, values and rituals with Kurdish Alevis. 
It is expected that the cross-cutting Alevi–Sunni cleavage improves inter-ethnic relations 
between Turks and Kurds (see Kocher 2002).
Moreover, Alevis were suppressed and persecuted under the Ottoman administration, 
which officially adopted Sunni (Hanefi) Islamic jurisprudence. As a result, they remained 
socially, politically and economically marginal and peripheral for centuries (Erdemir 2005). 
Although the suppression of Alevi identity declined after the establishment of the secular 
Republic in the early 1920s, Alevis’ marginal and peripheral status persisted (Erdemir 2005; 
Poyraz 2005). For instance, Erdemir (2005, p. 938) notes that before the 1980s, Alevis were 
defined as one of the three major threats to the Turkish state, together with communism 
and Kurdish nationalism. Having experienced Ottoman–Turkish discrimination and 
suppression, Alevis are more likely to have strong empathy towards Kurds, who have endured 
similar prejudice and discrimination in the social and public realms. last but not least, Alevis 
are also regarded as a secular, progressive, tolerant and democratic community (Shankland 
2003; Erdemir 2005, p. 939; Poyraz 2005, pp. 503–504). Thus, one might anticipate out-group 
bias to be limited within Alevi Turks and Kurds in Turkey:
H2: Alevi Turks and Kurds in Turkey are more likely to show tolerance towards ethnic out-group 
members.
(Ethno)nationalism
Social identity theory, which draws attention to the role of self-conception in group 
membership, group dynamics and processes and in intergroup interactions and relations, 
asserts that in an intergroup setting, group members seek to differentiate their in-group 
from out-groups by making comparisons that augment or accentuate similarities within the 
in-group and differences from out-groups. It is further argued that group members tend to 
achieve and maintain a positive social identity by assessing in-group members more 
positively or favourably than out-group members. As Hogg (2007, p. 902) states, ‘The group 
pursuit of positive distinctiveness is reflected in people’s desire to have a relatively favourable 
self-concept, in this case through positive social identity.’ A desire for a favourable self-
concept or self-esteem (i.e. positive social identity) encourages individuals to degrade out-
group members relative to in-group members (also known as in-group-favouring bias) (see 
Tajfel 1981, 1982; Tajfel & Turner 1986; Hogg 2006).
In the context of inter-ethnic relations, we expect in-group favouritism or ethnocentric 
orientations to be stronger among those who strongly identify themselves with the ethnic 
or national group, which decreases tolerance towards out-group members. For example, in 
202  Z. SARIGIl ANd E. KARAKOc
their studies of the US, Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson (1989) find that black nationalism is 
associated with intolerance towards whites. In the South African context, Gibson (2006) finds 
empirical support for a negative relationship between strong group attachment and 
intolerance. He suggests that those who feel less secure perceive an out-group threat more, 
which leads to high intolerance. A recent study that examines national identity in the 
European context suggests that higher in-group projection produces negative out-group 
attitudes, reducing intergroup social tolerance (Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus 2007).
The prolonged ethnic tension in Turkey provides an important testing ground for assessing 
the impact of ethnocentric orientations on social tolerance. It is a fact that citizenship in 
Turkey is founded upon Turkish identity (Yegen 2004). It is likely that Turks regard the nation 
as reflecting their own ethnic group rather than as an inclusive, shared category (celebi et 
al. 2014). Turks who perceive their ethnic group as the founding one are likely to discourage 
in-group dissent and spurn those who challenge their perception and narratives. We have 
no reason to believe that Kurds would behave differently towards those who aim to oppose 
or at least restrict their cultural, political and economic demands. In sum, strong ethnocentric 
orientations or positive in-group distinctiveness (i.e. the tendency to view the in-group more 
favourably than an out-group) would be stronger among (ethno)nationalists, and so they 
would have stronger negative attitudes towards out-group members. Thus, our expectation 
is that:
H3: (Ethno)nationalist group members are less likely to show tolerance towards ethnic out-
group members.
Intergroup social contact
The literature also draws attention to the effect of intergroup social contact on inter-ethnic 
social tolerance. Several studies in various national settings suggest that intergroup contact 
limits prejudice towards out-group members and limits hostility among groups. Thus, it is 
suggested that regular intergroup contact is likely to boost harmony and mutual 
understanding in society and so improve ethnic relations (e.g. see Allport 1954; Voci & 
Hewstone 2003; dovidio, Gaertner & Kawakami 2003; Mclaren 2003; Pettigrew 1997, 1998; 
Wagner et al. 2003; 2006; Brown et al. 2007; Pettigrew & Tropp 2006, 2008; Ward & Masgoret 
2006; dixon et al. 2010; Frølund Thomsen 2012; Hindriks, Verkuyten & coenders 2014). In 
the Scandinavian context, for instance, Frølund Thomsen (2012, p. 173) concludes that 
‘intergroup contact makes citizens more tolerant because enduring contact situations 
promote familiarity through individuating information. Intergroup contact also breeds ethnic 
tolerance through the weakening of perceived threat – although this effect is less strong.’ 
In the dutch setting, Hindriks, Verkuyten and coenders (2014) find that increased contact 
with members of a particular minority group decreases social distance and bias toward that 
group.
Allport (1954) emphasises that communication involving deep and intense interaction, 
such as discussing personal matters and political issues (rather than superficial 
communication), exerts a strong, positive influence on tolerance. communication that can 
produce social tolerance is more likely within families with diverse ethnic members. Therefore, 
we expect that individuals who have a spouse of another ethnic background or whose 
parents come from different ethnic groups are likely to be more tolerant. Even if one prefers 
one ethnic group over another, discussing private matters and political developments in a 
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family leads their members to support an out-group’s rights or to understand the concerns 
of the dominant group (e.g. Hayes & dowds 2006; dixon et al. 2010; Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew 
& Tropp 2011; Popan et al. 2010). It is also suggested that ethnic intermarriage might weaken 
ethnic identifications and so contribute to positive inter-ethnic relations. For instance, 
lieberson and Waters suggest that ‘intermarriage functions to create more ethnic 
heterogeneity in their social networks and may possibly lead to a diminution or dilution of 
ethnic identity’ (1988, p. 162). Thus, we expect that:
H4: Individuals having personal contact with out-group members are more likely to show 
tolerance towards ethnic out-group.
Variables, measurement and data
Dependent variable. In this study, we investigate the determinants of social (in)tolerance 
among Turks and Kurds. Thus, the dependent variable in this study is inter-ethnic social 
tolerance, which is difficult to measure precisely. Some existing empirical analyses, based 
on survey data, measure it by asking direct questions of the respondents. For instance, 
interviewees are expected to respond to questions such as ‘[The opposite ethnic group is] 
untrustworthy,’ ‘[The opposite ethnic group is] selfish,’ ‘[The opposite ethnic group makes] 
me uncomfortable.’ ‘It would be better if [the opposite ethnic group left] our country’ (e.g. 
see Gibson 2006).
We, however, think that asking such direct questions about out-group members may 
amplify social desirability bias and so enhance measurement error. Therefore, we included 
relatively more indirect questions in the questionnaire, with responses given as ‘1’ (yes) or 
‘2’ (no): ‘Would you be disturbed or bothered by a neighbour having [the opposite ethnic 
group] origin?’ ‘If your child gets married, would you accept a [the opposite ethnic group] 
son/daughter-in-law?’ ‘Imagine that you will set up a business firm and you need to find a 
partner. Would you work with a [the opposite ethnic group] business partner?’ and ‘Imagine 
that you have an apartment. Would you rent it to a [the opposite ethnic group] tenant?’ (see 
also dunn & Singh 2014; Hindriks, Verkuyten & coenders 2014).
To see whether these items are related to any unobserved latent variable, we conducted 
principal component analysis, presented in Table 1. The results show that three of these 
variables (i.e. son/daughter-in-law, business partner, renter/tenant) have relatively higher 
loadings on a single dimension or factor, which we call ‘social tolerance.’ By using these items, 
we constructed an additive index of social tolerance for each ethnic group, which ranges 
from 0 to 3.
Independent variables. Religiosity is one of our main independent variables. Several 
existing empirical works in the Turkish context suggest that religiosity should be treated as 
a complex, multidimensional concept, involving several aspects such as belief, attitude and 
practice (e.g. carkoglu 2005; carkoglu & Kalaycioglu 2009; Yesilada & Noordijk 2010). To 
capture its various dimensions, we conducted principal component analysis by using survey 
items related to religion (e.g. belief in an afterlife and God, daily praying, fasting and support 
for Sharia law). Our analyses generated two additive indices, capturing two different 
dimensions of religiosity: faith vs. attitudinal–practical. For a robustness check, we also 
utilised ‘self-reported degree of religiosity’ as an alternative indicator, but it did not change 
the multi-variate regression results. Regarding religious sect, we used self-reports to 
determine respondents’ sectarian affiliation.4
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It is also a challenging task to measure (ethno)nationalism, another main independent 
variable. We believe that support for (ethno)nationalist parties can be used as an indicator 
of nationalist orientations among in-group members. Thus, we used Turkish support for the 
ultranationalist, right-oriented Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) and 
Kurdish support for the pro-Kurdish Peace and democracy Party (Barış ve demokrasi Partisi 
– BdP) as a proxy for ethnic nationalism.5 To check our results, we also used an alternative 
measure: self-reported nationalist orientation, which generated quite similar results.
concerning social contact, we are interested in the possible impact of intergroup social 
contact in both the private and public spheres. Regarding contact in the private sphere, we 
used whether the respondent has a parent (either father or mother) or partner (i.e. fiancé/
fiancée or spouse) from an out-group. With respect to measuring social contact in the public 
sphere, the literature provides several measures. Some studies use ‘self-reported workplace 
contact’ (e.g. Frølund Thomsen 2012) while others use ‘friendship’ as an indicator of public 
social contact (e.g. dixon et al. 2010). In this research, due to lack of a direct indicator, we 
use ‘region’ as a proxy to measure contact in the public sphere. If the contact hypothesis is 
correct, then regional factors should also matter. We expect that daily interactions between 
in-group and out-group members will be relatively limited in ethnically homogeneous 
regions. Thus, we anticipate that a Kurdish individual in the southeast, where most Kurds in 
Turkey live, will have fewer opportunities for social contact with Turks in the public sphere. 
Similarly, a Turk from other regions will have relatively fewer chances to interact with a Kurd. 
Thus, we created a dummy variable to capture the impact of regional differences on ethnic 
tolerance: 0 = other regions; 1 = the southeast.
Control variables. The determinants of inter-ethnic tolerance are not limited to our main 
independent variables. The literature also offers other factors that may have some impact 
(positive or negative) on inter-ethnic tolerance. In the Turkish model, we control for threat 
perception, which is regarded as one of the most important predictors of intolerance (see 
Mclaren 2003; Gibson 2006; dunn & Singh 2014). One might expect that Turks who believe 
that official recognition of Kurdish ethnic identity and granting further cultural and/or 
political rights to Kurds would result in the disintegration of the country would react 
negatively to members of the Kurdish ethnic group. To put it differently, perceived threat 
(e.g. fear of disintegration) among in-group members might generate a negative attitude 
or even hostility towards members of an ethnic out-group, which, in return, reduces tolerance 
(see also McIntosh et al. 1995; Frølund Thomsen 2012). We measure perceived threat by 
using responses to the following survey item: ‘do you think that if the Turkish state grants a 
Table 1. Factor analysis (tolerance).
notes: Extraction method: principal component analysis. only one component was extracted (no rotation). Emboldened 
values mark relatively higher factor loadings.
Variables
Turks Kurds
Factor loadings Factor loadings
1 = social tolerance 1 = social tolerance
Son/daughter-in-law 0.836 0.804
Business partner 0.9 0.909
renter/tenant 0.88 0.892
neighbour 0.612 0.337
Variance (%) 66 59
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kind of “regional autonomy” or “federation” to Kurds, that would lead to the disintegration 
of the country?’ This measure ranged from 1 (yes) to 0 (no).
In the Kurdish model, we control for the possible impact of ‘perceived injustice’. Schmitt 
and Branscombe (2002) show a positive relationship between perceptions of discrimination 
and in-group identification, which in turn is expected to stimulate prejudice towards the 
dominant ethnic out-group. This variable involves two separate dimensions: political and 
socioeconomic. We predict that Kurds who have a perception of discrimination from the 
Turkish state will be less tolerant towards Turks simply because Kurds who think that the 
state violates their rights and freedoms are more likely to develop a negative attitude vis-à-
vis the Turkish out-group. In addition, the economic disparities that Kurds have long 
experienced may have led to a heightened awareness of their politicised ethnic identity. 
Kurds may easily establish a direct linkage between their poverty and ethnic identity, and 
blame the Turkish state and its founding ethnic group, Turks, who are mostly supportive of 
state policies that produce economic disparity between these two ethnic groups (Icduygu, 
Romano & Sirkeci 1999, p. 998).
To measure perceived injustice, we utilised the responses to the following questions: ‘In 
your opinion, do you think the Turkish state discriminates against Kurds in Turkey?’ and ‘In 
your opinion, do you think Kurds in Turkey enjoy similar political and cultural rights and 
freedoms as Turks?’ Similarly, we expect that Kurds who think that they are socioeconomically 
disadvantaged vis-à-vis Turks will be less tolerant towards Turks. Similarly to dixon et al. 
(2010), we measure socioeconomic injustice by using perceptions of socioeconomic inequity. 
We employed the following survey item: ‘In your opinion, do Kurds in Turkey have social and 
economic equality with Turks?’ Using these three survey items, we constructed an additive 
index of ‘perceived injustice’ for the Kurdish subsample. We also included gender, age, 
income, education, ideology (left–right), the size of residential area and economic satisfaction 
as common control variables in both models.
Data. To test the above hypotheses about inter-ethnic social tolerance in the Turkish 
setting, we utilise original and comprehensive public-opinion survey data. As part of a larger 
research project on the Kurdish issue in Turkey,6 we conducted a comprehensive public-
opinion survey in early April 2013.7 One of the authors took part in the research team that 
designed the survey, which was administered by A&G, a professional public-opinion research 
company based in Istanbul. Before implementing the survey, we conducted and participated 
in pilots in Istanbul, Ankara, Malatya, Mersin and diyarbakir. After the pilots, we invited all 
regional heads of A&G to Ankara to attend a half-day workshop to familiarise them with the 
research project and the questionnaire. The pilots showed that Kurdish participants appeared 
more comfortable and responsive when they were interviewed by a Kurdish-speaking female 
interviewer. Thus, in order to limit social desirability bias, we used trained and experienced 
female Kurdish interviewers from A&G in regions dominated by Kurds. The final survey 
involved face-to-face interviews with 7,103 participants from seven regions, 50 provinces 
and 398 districts and villages. Regarding sampling, respondents were selected using a multi-
stage, stratified, cluster-sampling procedure. Age and gender quotas were also applied.
The statistical analyses below were conducted with data provided by the Turkish and 
Kurdish sub-samples. There are multiple ways of identifying respondents’ ethnic origins. A 
common strategy is to use ‘mother language’ as an indicator. Another strategy is to rely on 
respondents’ reports of their ethnic origin or identity. For a robustness check, we utilised 
both and our descriptive analyses using these two different indicators produced similar 
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results. Thus, we only present the results based on participants’ self-definition as an indicator 
of ethnic origin. Accordingly, 76.3 per cent of respondents identify themselves as ethnic 
Turks; and 17.5 per cent declare themselves to be Kurdish. Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics for all the variables.
Empirical results
Descriptive findings. Beginning with the descriptive analyses, the results confirm that the 
level of social tolerance varies across the two groups. Figure 1 suggests that ethnic tolerance 
is much lower among Turks than among Kurds. As indicators of ethnic tolerance, we use 
support for or a positive attitude towards having a son/daughter-in-law, business partner, 
tenant or neighbour from an ethnic out-group. As Figure 1 indicates, average support level 
is much lower among Turks (65.9 per cent vs. 86.8 per cent among Kurds). Interestingly, 
however, in both groups, support for having a son/daughter-in-law from another ethnic 
group is the lowest (56.2 per cent and 77.7 per cent) and support for a neighbour from 
another ethnic group is the highest (81 per cent and 95 per cent). This distribution suggests 
that both Turks and Kurds are relatively less tolerant towards the idea of having a family 
member from an ethnic out-group, which can be interpreted as evidence of a certain degree 
of exclusionary attitude towards one another. However, this exclusionary attitude is stronger 
among Turks.
How can we explain such a gap between Turks and Kurds? Is it an anomaly or an expected 
pattern? Our descriptive finding appears to be consistent with identity theory, which holds 
that more-powerful and dominant groups tend to espouse stronger prejudices towards 
minority groups under conditions of prolonged, intractable conflict (Tajfel & Turner 1979; 
dixon & Ergin 2010). Gibson and Gouws (2003) argue that in deeply fractionalised societies, 
group identities lead their members to take on an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality towards 
nonconformist groups. Thus, ethnic Turks, who tend to align themselves with the Turkish 
state and hold stronger national identification with it, are more likely to develop negative 
attitudes towards Kurds, who generally do not conform to the state and its national identity 
Figure 1. turkish and Kurdish attitudes towards each other (april 2013).
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based on Turkishness. Alternatively, one might postulate that the outcome is due to the fact 
that Kurds have more out-group contacts, which diminishes their prejudice towards Turks 
(Tam et al. 2009). last, we might suggest that the difference is due to asymmetric distribution 
of information across the groups. Since Kurds constitute a minority in a country dominated 
by Turks, they will have more information on the ethnic majority.
Multi-variate statistical analyses. In order to analyse the determining factors of inter-ethnic 
social tolerance and test the hypotheses presented above, we conducted multi-variate 
regression analyses. Since our dependent variable ranged from 0 to 3, with four categories, 
we ran ordinal logistic regression due to the nature of the categories and for theoretical 
reasons (see also dow & Endersby 2004).
Table 3 presents the results of the ordinal logit analyses of inter-ethnic tolerance between 
Turks and Kurds. For the Turkish model, the results suggest that the faith dimension of 
religiosity does not matter. However, the attitudinal/practical dimension of religiosity seems 
to increase the likelihood of tolerance towards Kurds. Thus, the religiosity hypothesis is 
partially supported by the Turkish model. Regarding sectarian identification, we see that 
being Alevi does not exert any statistically significant effect on tolerance. This finding 
disproves our hypothesis about the impact of crosscutting cleavages on social tolerance. 
Table 3. ordinal logit analysis of inter-ethnic tolerance (turks and Kurds).
notes: the values in parentheses are robust standard errors. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Predictors
dependent variable: ‘ethnic tolerance towards out-group’
Turkish model Kurdish model
Religiosity/sectarian identity
religiosity (faith) 0.0696265 (0.1696837) 0.2874144 (0.2633693)
religiosity (attitude, practice) 0.1012953 (0.0193321)*** 0.0742976 (0.0508734)
alevi 0.0810806 (0.1241577) 0.3159018 (0.2693229)
(Ethno)nationalism
Mhp −0.5208718 (0.0781447)*** −1.045761 (0.1832339)***
Bdp
Intergroup social contact
out-group partner 0.8729331 (0.1514528)*** 0.1326767 (0.1930256)
in-group partner
out-group parents 0.8998031 (0.1165062)*** 0.1696034 (0.2270048)
in-group parents
Southeast 0.6538013 (0.2226038)** 0.2529792 (0.2017958)
Control variables
threat perception −0.2100297 (0.0797598)** −0.0218767 (0.0686315)
perceived injustice
ideology −0.0845029 (0.0415673)* 0.2,419,296 (0.1139217)*
Education 0.0487257 (0.0283994) 0.0965009 (0.0681929)
income 0.0677271 (0.0249234)** 0.0938981 (0.0723891)
Economic satisfaction 0.1,185,763 (0.0509644)* 0.1,627,123 (0.1357135)
the size of residential area 0.0977123 (0.0362201)** 0.0831439 (0.0868834)
Gender 0.0033161 (0.0590438) −0.1433817 (0.1562424)
age 0.0038143 (0.0022893) 0.0035524 (0.0071556)
τ1 0.9194295 (0.4382203) 0.1765734 (1.005984)
τ2 1.47959 (0.4387638) 0.630008 (1.009021)
τ 3 2.007436 (0.4390135) 1.499589 (1.018492)
N 4,345 1,046
pseudo R2 0.0327 0.0469
log pse. likelihood −5105.3223 −829.33988
Wald χ2 (15) 261.88 73.12
prob > χ2 0.0000 0.0000
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One of the most robust and consistent findings is related to the impact of nationalist 
orientation: voting for the ultranationalist party (i.e. the MHP) is associated with a low level 
of tolerance towards Kurds, proving the hypothesis about the impact of ethnonationalist 
orientations (see also carkoglu & Toprak 2007, p. 53). concerning the contact hypothesis, 
we see that having private contacts with out-group members (i.e. having a Kurdish parent 
and/or a Kurdish partner) increases the likelihood of Turks’ social tolerance towards Kurds.8 
The public contact variable, operationalised as residing in the Kurdish southeast, also 
increases Turkish tolerance towards Kurds. These results suggest that more interactions with 
Kurds as a result of living in the region and more intimate contacts as a result of having a 
Kurdish family member are likely to contribute to Turks’ tolerance towards Kurds.
With respect to control variables in the Turkish model, threat perception appears to reduce 
Turks’ tolerance towards Kurds. In other words, Turks who think that granting further rights 
to the Kurdish out-group would result in the disintegration of the country are less likely to 
have a positive attitude vis-à-vis Kurds. Similarly, moving from the left of the ideological 
spectrum to the right also decreases tolerance towards Kurds. This result suggests that left-
oriented Turkish individuals are more likely to show tolerance towards Kurds (see also 
carkoglu & Toprak 2007, p. 53; Yesilada & Noordijk 2010, p. 22). Economic factors such as 
income level and economic satisfaction also seem to enhance tolerance towards Kurds. 
Finally, Turks living in urban centres are relatively more likely to have a positive attitude vis-
à-vis Kurds (see also carkoglu & Toprak 2007, p. 51). This finding can also be interpreted as 
an indicator of the positive role of social contact with Kurds in urban settings.
Moving to the Kurdish model, we find that, contrary to the Turkish model, neither the 
belief nor the practice dimension of religiosity has any statistically significant effect on social 
tolerance among Kurds. In other words, the Kurdish model disproves the religiosity 
hypothesis. As in the Turkish model, however, in terms of sectarian differences, Alevis (Kurds) 
are not distinguishable in terms of the tolerance they exhibit towards out-group members. 
Ethnocentric orientations seem to operate similarly within the Kurdish group. Kurds who 
vote for an ethnonationalist political party are less likely to show tolerance towards Turks. 
In other words, the Kurdish model also confirms the hypothesis, which expects a negative 
impact of ethnonationalist orientations on social tolerance. As for the contact variables, 
none of them (i.e. having a partner and/or a parent from ethnic out-groups or living in 
Kurdish-dominant areas) exerts any significant effect on Kurds’ tolerance towards Turks, 
disconfirming the contact hypothesis.
In terms of the control variables in the Kurdish model, contrary to our expectations, the 
perception of injustice does not reduce the likelihood of tolerance towards Turks. To put it 
differently, Kurds with a perception of injustice are not less likely to be tolerant towards 
members of the dominant Turkish out-group. This result is probably because Kurds attribute 
the source of injustice to state policies and actions rather than to specific members of Turkish 
society (see also Gurses 2010; Karakoc 2013). In contrast to the Turkish model, left-oriented 
Kurds are less likely to show tolerance towards Turks. To put it differently, compared with 
left-oriented Kurds, right-oriented Kurds are more likely to show tolerance towards members 
of the Turkish ethnic out-group. Hence, ideology operates quite differently across these two 
ethnic groups. This finding suggests that the likelihood of conflict or tension is greater among 
right-oriented Turks and left-oriented Kurds. Also contrary to the Turkish model, economic 
factors (i.e. income and economic satisfaction) do not have any statistically significant impact 
on Kurdish tolerance. And in both models, education fails to have any impact. These results 
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suggest that improvements in Kurds’ socioeconomic status would not necessarily improve 
Kurdish tolerance towards Turks.
Conclusions and implications
Overall, our empirical analyses of inter-ethnic tolerance show that different factors and 
dynamics shape the level of tolerance within ethnic majority and minority groups in the 
Turkish setting. Such an outcome should not be surprising because the experiences and 
expectations of these two groups have been quite different. Kurdish ethnic identity was 
denied and suppressed by the Turkish state until the early 2000s (Yegen 2009). On the other 
hand, Turkish identity, which constituted the foundation of the Republican nation state, has 
been promoted as the dominant, overarching category by the state through many channels, 
such as national education. The Turkish case, thus, suggests that when we study inter-ethnic 
tolerance we should also take into account the implications of differences in group status.
Our findings partly support the literature that takes religiosity as a superordinate identity 
and expects it to increase social tolerance. As our statistical results indicate, religiosity seems 
to boost social tolerance towards Kurds within the Turkish ethnic group. However, the 
religiosity hypothesis does not work in the case of the Kurdish group. In other words, the 
attitudinal and practical dimensions of religiosity exert a significant positive impact on social 
tolerance only within the dominant ethnic group – Turks.
In light of this finding, it is interesting to observe that several conservative circles in Turkey 
treat Islam as a ‘shared value’, ‘a unifying bond’ or a ‘bridge’ between Turks and Kurds, and 
expect that promoting Islamic ideas and values within the Kurdish ethnic minority will curb 
Kurdish ethnonationalism and improve inter-ethnic relations. Our findings show that such 
an assumption is problematic. Islam can be a shared value but Islamic identity does not 
necessarily constitute an antidote to Kurdish ethnonationalism or intolerance. Thus, the 
discourse of ‘Islamic brotherhood’ may sell well among religious Turks and even ensure a 
certain degree of support for the conservative AKP government’s recent efforts to find a 
peaceful settlement to the Kurdish problem (see also Akturk 2011), but such a discourse may 
not have the desired effect among Kurds (see also Sarigil & Fazlioglu 2014; Gurses 2015). A 
recent ethnographic study shows that Kurdish ethnonationalists are highly critical of such 
discourse, considering such ideas assimilationist (see Sarigil & Fazlioglu 2013).
Sectarian identity (i.e. being Alevi) does not really boost social tolerance among Turks or 
Kurds. This finding questions the argument that the cross-cutting Alevi–Sunni cleavage 
improves inter-ethnic relations between Turks and Kurds in the Turkish setting. (Ethno)
nationalist attachments and tendencies appear to have a consistent negative impact on 
social tolerance in both models. Put differently, nationalist Turks and Kurds are both less 
likely to be tolerant towards ethnic out-group members. This finding suggests that 
accentuating Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms is likely to prevent constructive dialogue, 
undermining the social and political order in Turkey (see also Özkırımlı 2014).
Regarding the role of social contact, the Turkish model provides evidence confirming the 
contact hypothesis. Private contact (having a partner and parent from the out-group) 
enhances tolerance towards out-group members among Turks. In addition, Turks living in 
the southeast (mostly inhabited by Kurds) are more likely to interact with Kurds. As a result, 
we see that Turks in that region show more social tolerance towards Kurds. The Kurdish 
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model, however, does not provide any supporting evidence for the contact hypothesis. 
Having personal contact with out-group members in either the private or public sphere 
does not affect Kurds’ social tolerance. One practical implication of these findings is that 
increasing contact between Turks and Kurds has the potential to improve inter-ethnic 
relations in the Turkish context. It would at least facilitate the evolution of a positive attitude 
towards the ethnic minority (i.e. Kurds) among the ethnic majority (i.e. Turks).
concerning other notable findings, higher perceptions of threat (e.g. fear of disintegration) 
seem to reduce Turks’ tolerance towards Kurds. Policies aimed at changing such perceptions 
would certainly contribute to improved inter-ethnic relations between the two groups. In 
addition, improvements in economic well-being would also facilitate the evolution of more 
positive attitudes among Turks towards Kurds. However, socioeconomic variables fail to 
explain Kurds’ attitudes towards Turks. This finding implies that socioeconomic measures 
would not necessarily alter Kurdish attitudes.
considering all of the above, empirical analyses of inter-ethnic tolerance in Turkish context 
show that the social setting in Turkey appears to be not so favourable for democratic 
consolidation. In other words, in terms of the social requisites of democracy (e.g. tolerance), 
there are still major hurdles in front of Turkish democratic development. Although the official 
state discourse presents Turks and Kurds as inseparable units, coexisting peacefully, the 
empirical findings of this study show that inter-ethnic relations between Turks and Kurds 
are not without tensions or difficulties. It appears that the ongoing Kurdish conflict in Turkey 
has promoted inter-ethnic tensions. As one manifestation of such tensions, we see an 
increasing number of clashes between Turkish and Kurdish mass groups in urban centres. 
limited inter-ethnic social and political tolerance and the resultant inter-ethnic tensions 
and clashes not only threaten political stability in the country but also retard the 
democratisation process.
We believe that the empirical findings of this study contribute to the several existing 
debates in the fields of inter-ethnic relations and tolerance and democratisation. In 
particular, while most studies in the ethnic tolerance literature have investigated attitudes 
towards minority groups, they have ignored how minority groups develop attitudes towards 
majority groups (doosje, Ellemers & Spears 1995). We aim to shed light on this understudied 
relationship between members of an ethnic minority and majority in the Turkish setting, 
where there is a limited number of studies on social tolerance between Kurds and Turks. 
Second, our finding on religiosity challenges the dominant view: we discovered that, 
contrary to the dominant understanding, strong religious identification results in strong 
tolerance towards Kurds among Turks, but not towards Turks among Kurds. Third, to our 
knowledge, this is the first study that tests the impact of a salient sectarian identity on 
tolerance, and it finds that belonging to a cross-cutting sectarian identity (i.e. being Alevi) 
does not necessarily increase tolerance towards ethnic out-group members. Fourth, the 
findings mark the difficulties of the democratisation process in the Turkish setting. Although 
the Turkish state has taken several steps to accommodate some Kurdish demands since 
the early 2000s, public Turkish intolerance towards the Kurdish minority is still high. This 
fact suggests that the moderation of the state’s attitude towards the Kurdish problem and 
the state’s efforts to enhance Kurdish minority rights are not necessarily improving inter-
ethnic relations and attitudes. Instead, we see still strong Turkish intolerance towards Kurds 
and Kurdish rights.
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Notes
1.  There are also studies arguing that Kurds in Turkey comprise higher percentages of the total 
population such as 20 per cent (e.g. see Romano & Gurses 2014, p. 11) or 20–28 per cent (Gunes 
2012, p. 1).
2.  For a few exceptions, see e.g. dixon & Ergin 2010; Çelebi et al. 2014.
3.  due to social, economic and political marginalisation, Alevis have been reluctant to reveal 
their identity, making it difficult to know precisely how many Alevis live in Turkey. The size 
of the Alevi community is estimated to be around 10–20 per cent of the population (e.g. see 
carkoglu 2005; Erman & Göker 2000; Erdemir 2005; Poyraz 2005). Our survey findings show 
that six per cent of respondents declare themselves to be Alevi; however, ‘no response’ answers 
are particularly high for this survey item (six per cent) and we suspect that most of these are 
from respondents of Alevi origin. Thus, we can estimate that the Alevi population corresponds 
to at least ten per cent of Turkish society. Using a more indirect set of survey items, carkoglu 
(2005) estimates the size of the Alevi population to be around 15 per cent.
4.  due to lack of a better measure, we rely on respondents’ self-reports; however, we recognize 
the possibility of social desirability bias with the survey items that directly ask the respondents 
which religious sect they belong to (see also note 7). Nevertheless, this survey item will at least 
allow us to see if strong Alevi identification has any impact on inter-ethnic tolerance.
5.  Our descriptive analyses show that among Kurds, BdP voters are more likely to have 
ethnonationalist orientations (e.g. support for Kurdish independence). Thus, support for the 
BdP becomes a useful proxy for ethnonationalist orientations among Kurds. The BdP, which 
represented the Kurdish movement in party politics at the time of the survey, was replaced by 
People’s democracy Party (Halkların demokrasi Partisi – HdP) in 2014.
6.  The data that this study utilises come from a broader research project fully funded by the TEPAV 
(Türkiye Ekonomi Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı – Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey). 
The first author of this article took part as one of the leading researchers in that research project. 
The primary motivation of that research was to understand and explain Kurdish demands and 
Turkish reactions to those demands. Another goal was to analyse inter-ethnic relations between 
Turks and Kurds in the Turkish setting.
7.  Thus, the survey was conducted during a relatively peaceful social and political environment 
(i.e. in the aftermath of PKK leader Öcalan’s letter calling for a ceasefire in March 2013). If 
we repeated the same survey under the conditions of armed conflict and bloodshed which 
resumed in summer 2015, we would likely get a higher degree of social distance between Turks 
and Kurds simply because during armed conflict, the ethnic majority group’s prejudice and 
exclusionary attitude towards the ethnic minority is likely to be exacerbated (see also Tajfel & 
Turner 1979; dixon & Ergin 2010; Hutchison 2014).
8.  We should, however, acknowledge the possibility of the endogeneity problem with the ‘partner’ 
variable (having a partner, wife or husband from an ethnic out-group) because marrying 
someone from an ethnic out-group may be due to having high tolerance for out-group 
members. However, endogeneity is not really an issue with the ‘parent’ variable, which has a 
positive and significant impact on ethnic tolerance.
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